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The First Amendment and Data Privacy:
Securing Data Privacy Laws That
Withstand Constitutional Muster
Kathryn Peyton

Abstract
Given the growing ubiquity of digital technology’s presence in
people’s lives today, it is becoming increasingly more necessary to
secure data privacy protections. People interact with technology
constantly, ranging from when engaging in business activates, such
as corresponding through emails or doing research online, to more
innocuous activities like driving, shopping, or talking with friends
and family. The advances in technology have made possible the creation of digital trails whenever someone interacts with such technology. Companies aggregate data from data trails and use predictive analytics to create detailed profiles about citizen-consumers.
This information is typically used for profit generating purposes.
The way Big Data is being used threatens individuals’ autonomy
because users of Big Data are becoming increasingly more successful in shifting citizen-consumer’s behaviors to meet the guider’s objectives.
This Article discusses the difficulty in enacting laws that protect
individuals’ data information, as such laws potentially come into
conflict with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. This Article proceeds to analyze whether data is speech and concludes that
it is likely speech. Thus, regulating data information raises First
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Amendment concerns. Regulating data is in essence regulating people’s ability to obtain information. By preventing dissemination of
information, freedom of speech has very little value because people
don’t have the information they otherwise would have obtained.
Consequently, individuals cannot speak about such information they
don’t have, and this thus diminishes speech. Despite finding data
likely constitutes speech, and thus regulating data poses free speech
concerns, this Article argues that securing data privacy is necessary
to safeguard the same objectives freedom of speech protects. Data
privacy is necessary to protect the creation of new ideas and differing opinions because people may self-censor their behavior if such
behavior is completely exposed to the public. To ensure the continuance of a citizenry that critically engages in society, data privacy
is necessary, not just freedom of speech.
In striking the balance between securing data privacy, while still
affording a level of freedom of speech that promotes democratic ideals, this Article contends data privacy regulations should be analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine, and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. Next, this Article argues that the Court should
uphold data privacy regulations as meeting the requirement of being
no more restrictive than necessary so long as they pertain to the
protections common in codes of fair information practices. These
protections directly safeguard (1) the use of the data, ensuring use
is consistent with the purpose of why the data was originally collected; (2) individuals’ right to notice and participate in how their
data is being used; (3) extra protections for sensitive data pertaining
to race, sexual orientation, political views, and religion; and lastly,
(4) a system for enforcement, including available remedies for individuals who have been wronged. The Court should uphold data privacy regulations embodying these protects because they advance the
government’s substantial interest in preserving autonomy amongst
individuals in order to protect self-governance. Further, such regulations directly are narrowly tailored because they regulate the
concerns of data privacy that threaten individuals’ ability for selfdetermination.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over a century after Warren and Brandeis emphasized the importance of
privacy in their iconic article The Right to Privacy—in which they argued that
people have a “right to be let alone”—privacy remains a fundamental concern
in our society.1 It is becoming increasingly important to establish protections
to safeguard this right, given the ubiquitous and invasive nature of advanced
technology.2 Today, technology is present in all aspects of people’s lives,
ranging from its use for business-related tasks to more innocuous behaviors
such as watching television, talking with friends and family over the phone,
online shopping, and even driving.3 As such, it is increasingly more difficult
to avoid using computerized technology when engaging in society. It almost
as if people do not have a choice other than to opt into these modes of engagement to be a productive member of our technology-driven world.
Advances in technology have made developments such as Big Data4 possible. Every time an individual interacts with technology, a data trail is being
generated.5 This occurs, for example, when using an application on one’s
phone or wearing a health-monitoring watch.6 Each digital trail of information generated is combined with other data sources to produce Big Data.7
Businesses and organizations analyze Big Data in order to discover patterns
about individuals, thus resulting in predictive analytics8 used to create detailed
individual profiles.9 These results are then used by businesses to make

1. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
2. This article uses the word “technology” to refer to digital technology, which is defined as
“electronic equipment and applications that use information in the form of numeric code. This information is usually in binary code.” Jayden Harmon, What are Digital Technologies?, QUORA (Apr.
27, 2018), https://www.quora.com/What-are-digital-technologies.
3. See Ronald Van Loon, What is Big Data And How Does It Work?, DATA SCI. CTR. (Dec. 12,
2017), https://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/what-is-big-data-and-how-does-it-work.
4. “Big Data” is a generalized and imprecise term but can be used to refer to “the use of large
data sets in data science and predictive analytics.” Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due
Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014).
5. See Van Loon, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. “Predictive analytics” is defined as “the practice of extracting information from existing data
sets in order to determine patterns and predict future outcomes and trends.” Vangi Beal, Predictive
Analytics, WEBOPEDIA, https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/predictive_analytics.html (last visited
Jan. 17, 2020).
9. Van Loon, supra note 3; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 4, at 93.
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marketing decisions which can impact individuals’ experiences with the world
around them.10 The detailed profiles generated do not always produce optimal
results, however, as the profiles can create an inaccurate picture.11 This can
cause businesses utilizing Big Data to make misguided decisions because they
rely so heavily on such data, believing it produces results with greater truth,
accuracy, and objectivity.12
Whether or not predictive analytics produce accurate results, Big Data
practices still violate general privacy concerns. The implementation of these
practices infringes on what privacy theorists describe as the right of “control
over personal information.”13 An example of this type of privacy violation is
the infamous incident in which the retail chain Target used Big Data to predict
which of its female customers were pregnant by looking at customers’ purchase histories.14 For instance, if a customer bought items such as unscented
lotions, scent-free soap, sanitizers, washcloths, or calcium supplements, Target would assign her a high pregnancy prediction score and would thereby
increase the amount of advertising directed at her for baby-related goods.15
In one case, a teenage girl’s father found out that his daughter was pregnant
before she was able to tell him because Target persistently sent advertisements
for baby items to the family’s home.16 Such disclosures are problematic because they rob individuals of their autonomy in controlling information relating to intimate details about their personal lives.
The role that technology plays in almost all aspects of human interactions
and the resulting ubiquity of Big Data brings to light a concern for information
10. Van Loon, supra note 3.
11. For example, relying on Big Data generated by its search results, Google drastically overestimated peak flu levels compared to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (“CDC”) estimate.
Declan Butler, When Google got flu wrong, NATURE (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.nature.com/news/when-google-got-flu-wrong-1.12413. The CDC’s estimates were based off of doctors
reporting patients’ complaints, whereas Google relied on predicting who had the flu based off of individuals’ flu-related search results. Id. Google’s overestimation can be attributed to more people
searching for flu symptoms that year, despite being sick, because of the widespread media coverage
of severe cases. Id.
12. See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 4.
13. Scholar Alan Westin describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated.”
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 24 (2008).
14. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out How A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father
Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#129f5aff6668.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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privacy. To address privacy concerns and protect the right to be let alone,
data privacy laws must be enacted that will withstand constitutional muster by
not violating the First Amendment.17 This Article argues that data information
privacy laws should be analyzed under the Commercial Speech Doctrine.18
Further, in setting the parameters of what regulations withstand intermediate
scrutiny, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court should recognize laws
which put into place the protections common in codes of fair information practices. The recommended protections would be narrowly tailored, pertaining
to safeguarding (1) the use of the data (i.e., ensuring use is consistent with the
purpose of why the data was originally collected);19 (2) individuals’ right to
notice and participate in how their data is being used;20 (3) extra protections
for sensitive data pertaining to race, sexual orientation, political views, and
religion;21 and lastly, (4) a system for enforcement, including available remedies for individuals who have been wronged.22 Laws embodying these protections should withstand intermediate scrutiny under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine because they directly regulate the federal government’s concerns.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II discusses whether data is
speech, and if so, whether laws regulating information privacy would be subject to free speech concerns. Part III discusses the role of the First Amendment in the protection of data information and privacy, concluding that there
must be a balance between protecting free speech and privacy, because both
are necessary for traditional American ideals of the Founding Fathers to exist.
Part IV poses a possible solution to securing information privacy laws that
withstand constitutional muster by maintaining First Amendment protections
while honoring the Commercial Speech Doctrine. Part IV concludes the Article by proposing a plan for the solution’s implementation.

17. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
18. See generally James B. Franks, The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment,
12 TULSA L. J. 699, 699–700 (2013) (explaining that commercial speech, in other words, speech that
includes commercial information, such as advertisements, is protectable by the First Amendment).
19. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standard for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector,
80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 514 (1995).
20. Id. at 515.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 515–16.

56

[Vol. 2019: 51]

The First Amendment and Data Privacy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

II. WHETHER DATA IS SPEECH
When addressing whether a law violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right to free speech, one of the first questions that must be asked is
whether the law in question is targeting speech. If the law is merely addressing conduct, then there is no First Amendment issue. To this end, there is
considerable debate among privacy scholars as to whether data constitutes
speech.
A. Arguments That Data is Speech
Some legal scholars, such as Eugene Volokh, take the firm view that data
is speech.23 Volokh argues that the right to control data information translates
into “my right to control your communication of personally identifiable information about me.”24 This, in effect, creates “a right to have the government
stop you from speaking about me.”25 Analyzing data privacy laws from this
perspective makes clear that such regulations effectively are inhibiting
speech. Volokh rebuts other scholars’ arguments for a code of fair information practices (discussed below) by arguing the First Amendment already
provides fair parameters delineating how data may be disclosed.26 These parameters favor speech because most of the rules regulating data information
collection run afoul of the First Amendment.27 Thus, according to Volokh,
these laws are not defensible.28
Specifically, Volokh believes that search engine results constitute speech
and therefore are protected.29 The modes of communication used by our society have changed considerably since First Amendment jurisprudence first
began to develop. Volokh notes that while people once turned to newspapers,
guidebooks, and encyclopedias, today, individuals go to search engines like
Google for news and other sought-after information.30 In delivering its

23. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000).
24. Id. at 1050.
25. Id. at 1051.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine
Results, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884 (2012).
30. Id.
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consumers news and search query results, Google selects and sorts results in
a way that each individual user will find the most helpful and useful.31 To do
this, Google implements a computerized algorithm that prioritizes search results based off of metrics such as the frequency and location of keywords, how
long a webpage has existed (giving greater value to pages that have a longer
established history of being on the web), and the number of webpages that
link to the page in question.32 Although the traditional newspaper or printencyclopedia did not automatically sort its information this way, Google is
still similar to these predecessor information sources as individuals now turn
to Google as they once did to newspapers and encyclopedias to gain information.
Agreeing with the two federal cases which held Google’s search engine
results are protected speech, Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.33
and Langdon v. Google, Inc,34 Volokh argues that automation does not render
speech unprotected.35 He explains that algorithms are created by people, and
in the context of search engines, ranking algorithms can be likened to editorial
judgments.36 Thus, the search engine speech belongs to the corporation, just
as the speech of what employees of a corporate newspaper create or select
belongs to the newspaper corporation.37 Secondly, Volokh explains that First
Amendment protection not only focuses on a speaker’s rights, but also protects the rights of listeners and readers.38 Automation is necessary in providing users with “free, convenient, quick, and comprehensive access” and consequently only increases the value of speech to the user.39
Volokh’s search engine analysis can also apply to Big Data and data information generally. Similar to search engine rankings, Big Data can likewise
31. Id.
32. Id.; Jonathan Strickland, How Google Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Dec. 20, 2006), https://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/google1.htm.
33. The district court held that Google was protected from liability for tortious interference with a
contractual relationship for allegedly lowering Search King’s ranking on Google’s search engine, because Google’s search ranking constitutes protected speech. See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech.,
Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
34. The district court held that Google has the First Amendment right to not post certain website
ads, likening Googles decision to an editorial judgment. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d
622, 622 (D. Del. 2007).
35. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 29, at 886, 888.
36. Id. at 888–89.
37. Id. at 889.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 888–89.
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constitute speech because humans create the algorithms for data-mining software, just as humans created Google’s ranking algorithm. Further, the
knowledge provided to users of Big Data is as useful as the information the
ranked search results provide to users of search engines. Individuals who
search on a search engine access an abundance of information that may, in
effect, change their perspective and inform their decisions. Big Data also informs the actions of those individuals analyzing it.40 Big Data gives users
access to information detailing patterns about individuals, enabling users to
make their decisions based off of such behaviors.
Companies, rather than individuals, are typically the entities that implement algorithms to track and sort data, and they use that data to create reports
predicting users’ behavior, oftentimes for marketing purposes.41 This benefits
the company because their tailored individualized approach to marketing can
increase profits.
The right to create knowledge is another theory that supports the proposition that data information is speech.42 Professor Jane Bambauer argues that
data must be speech because two of the latent prerequisites to free speech are
free thought and information flow.43 Like Volokh, Professor Bambauer points
out that the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect the person receiving the message, and not just the speaker.44 The logic behind this is that
if the government could regulate thoughts by restricting access to information,
free speech would have very little value.45
Professor Bambauer also analyzes the protection of data as speech as being consistent with the marketplace of ideas.46 The marketplace of ideas is a
theory that justifies the protection of free speech through the notion that there
should be an open marketplace for the exchange of ideas, where bad ideas
eventually lose out to good ones.47 This “marketplace of ideas” promotes the

40. See Jeff Desjardins, Here’s What the Big Tech Companies Know About You, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/heres-what-the-big-tech-companiesknow-about-you/.
41. See Richard Wheaton, Why retailers need to embrace cloud computing for growing sales, THE
DRUM (July 29, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2019/07/29/why-retailers-needembrace-cloud-computing-growing-sales.
42. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 86–87 (2014).
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id. at 87.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 91–96.
47. Id. at 92.
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free competition of the minds of Americans.48
Professor Bambauer argues that data has the power to change minds and
thus belongs in the marketplace.49 For example, she explains that this type of
data changed beliefs about the cause of ulcers.50 Historically, it was believed
that stress caused ulcers.51 Some courts even accepted evidence that a plaintiff
suffered from an ulcer as proof of a physical manifestation of stress as required to win damages in intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.52
However, this belief was dismantled when scientists discovered a type of bacterium common to all who suffered from ulcers that could survive in stomach
acid.53 When patients were treated with antibiotics for their ulcers, rather than
simply resting, the patients were cured 900% more often.54 Ultimately, access
to data information in the marketplace of ideas is what led to changing the
belief that stress causes ulcers, and access to this information can further lead
to other beneficial discoveries.
B. Arguments That Data is Not Speech
Unlike Professor Bambauer, Professor Neil Richards instead argues that
distinctions should be drawn between speech and information flows.55 He
suggests that data privacy and the First Amendment can be reconciled because
most laws regulating data are regulating conduct, not speech.56 Professor
Richards states that regulations for the use, collection, and disclosure of personal data are often introduced as a code of fair information practices.57 One
of the first enacted codes of fair information practices, The Privacy Act of
1974,58 was passed to regulate federal agencies and has been influential in
48. Id.
49. Id. at 93.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1149, 1166 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits federal agencies from disclosing personal information retrieved from federal systems of records without the written consent of the individual the information
pertains to, unless the disclosure is pursuant to one of the twelve statutory exceptions. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, Privacy Act of 1974, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last visited Jan. 17,
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providing a framework to pass additional state and federal laws regulating the
private sector.59 There is a general consensus among scholars that these codes
typically guarantee four protections against the misuse of data.60
The first protection that the codes of fair information practices ensure is
the implementation of standards for data quality, which requires data to be
collected lawfully and used for specific purposes.61 The data collector must
use the data only for purposes compatible with the original intent of collecting
the data, which restrains inappropriate secondary uses.62
Second, these codes provide standards for the transparency of information
processing.63 The core element of this standard is to have the individual participate in the treatment of their personal information.64 In sum, information
processing must be transparent to all citizens.65
Third, the codes create special protections for sensitive data.66 Such data
that warrants extra scrutiny by citizens includes information relating to race,
religion, health, or political beliefs.67
Finally, these codes also address the enforcement of fair information practices.68 For the regulations to work, there must first be supervision and oversight of the treatment of individuals’ information.69 Additionally, there must
be remedies for those who have been wronged.70
Professor Richards adopts Professor Paul Schwartz’s view that a majority
of regulations in a code of fair information practices actually govern conduct
and do not target speech.71 Professor Schwartz argues that out of the four
protections provided by a code of fair information practices, the first, second,
and fourth protections do not implicate speech at all.72 Rather, those
2020).
59. Richards, supra note 55, at 1166–67.
60. Id. at 1167.
61. Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 514.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 515.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 515–16.
69. Id. at 515.
70. Id.
71. Richards, supra note 55, at 1168; Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy:
Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1561–62 (2000).
72. Id.
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provisions merely regulate business practices or conduct.73
Professor Schwartz does acknowledge, however, that the third protection—preventing the disclosure of sensitive data—does burden free speech.74
He admits that this subset does fit into Volokh’s view of “information privacy
as the right to stop people from talking about you.”75 Consequently, preventing the disclosure of sensitive data likely violates the First Amendment. However, Professor Richards and Professor Schwartz would argue that although
regulations of the disclosure of sensitive data may burden speech, most of
these regulations address conduct and thus do not pose free speech concerns.
Therefore, they would justify most of these regulations in a code of fair information practices.
Presenting an alternative view, Professor Tim Wu argues that data produced by computers is not speech and that the First Amendment is only intended to protect humans.76 He rejects the court’s decision in Search King,
Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc., as he disagrees that Google’s rankings of
search results, which are derived from algorithms, constitute speech.77 He
refutes the analogy posed by Volokh, likening Google’s algorithms to an editor of a newspaper, by stating: “Socrates was a man who died for his views;
computer programs are utilitarian instruments meant to serve us.”78
Professor Wu urges that the First Amendment’s intended purpose was to
protect humans against the evils of state censorship, not to protect commercial
automation from regulation.79 Again, Professor Wu uses an analogy in refuting the notion that algorithms are speech because they were programmed by
people with First Amendment rights.80 He equates giving algorithms constitutional rights to Dr. Frankenstein’s monster having the right to vote, just because he is able to walk and talk.81 Professor Wu therefore urges against computers being able to inherit constitutional rights.82

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1562.
76. Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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C. Data is Likely Speech
Scholars on both sides of the issue have posed convincing arguments as
to why data is or is not speech. Volokh and Bambauer argue that the First
Amendment protects not only the speaker’s rights, but also the rights of the
person receiving the information.83 If there are laws curtailing the gathering
of information, this harms the would-be user of the information because it
prevents him or her from ever gaining that knowledge.
However, Richards, pointing to other scholars’ work, argues data information laws regulate conduct and not the dissemination of speech.84 Further,
Wu argues the First Amendment is meant to protect people, not commercial
automation.85 The key in finding which of these principles should be adopted
is to discern how far before the actual utterance of speech should be protected
in order to safeguard free speech rights.
As Bambauer points out, allowing the free flow of information is consistent with most of the theories behind why the First Amendment exists.86
From a marketplace of ideas perspective, not restricting data information collection is in line with the search for truth.87 Individuals must be able to receive
information in order to engage with others in search of the best ideas. Further,
the right to receive data information corresponds with the notion that free
speech serves to protect democratic participation, particularly dissident opinions.88 Having the right to access information protects the critical thinking
necessary for self-governance.
The Court has also recognized protection must be afforded to not just
speech, but what comes before speech. Justice Brandeis, an advocate for privacy, even supported the notion that knowledge is essential to free speech,
stating, “[t]hose who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth.”89 In sum, being able to receive information
presupposes knowledge and being knowledgeable is a prerequisite to speech.
In Branzburg v. Hayes, although the Court did not grant the press

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Volokh & Falk, supra note 29, at 889; Bambauer, supra note 42, at 87.
Richards, supra note 55.
Wu, supra note 76.
Bambauer, supra note 42, at 91–106.
See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1983).
Bambauer, supra note 42, at 97.
Id. at 97-98; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
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immunity from being compelled to testify and reveal confidential news
sources, the Court still acknowledged journalists are afforded extra protections in order to safeguard the free flow of information.90 In pertinent part,
the Court stated, “[w]e do not . . . [suggest] that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”91 This statement can be
analogized to the idea that without the right to receive information, freedom
of speech could be eviscerated.
Given the Court’s history with securing rights necessary for speech, it is
likely that data information constitutes speech. The Court affirmed this belief
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., by rejecting the argument that a law prohibiting
the sale of medical information, revealing the prescriptions doctors have prescribed patients, did not regulate speech but simply access to information.92
The Court reasoned, based on a long history of precedent, that “[a]n individual’s right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’ or
disseminated.”93
Going forward, the Court will likely follow its precedent and treat data
information as speech. However, like in Branzburg where the Court did not
afford the press unlimited privileges in the name of preserving free speech,
the Court should strike a balance and not allow the unfettered disclosure of
data information. Such unregulated information disclosures can certainly curtail democratic objectives.
III. INFORMATION PRIVACY IS CENTRAL TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS
Looking at the history behind why the Founding Fathers secured the right
to free speech is illuminating on the topic of information privacy. Free speech
was, and still is, meant to protect the democratic process of self-governance.
However, some level of privacy is necessary to preserve a self-governing society. Although finding the balance can be difficult, it is necessary.

90.
91.
92.
93.

64

Bambauer, supra note 42 at 85; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
Id.
564 U.S. 552, 557, 567 (2011).
Id. at 568.
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A. Historical Purpose of the First Amendment
The First Amendment was adopted to protect the individual liberty of citizens and create a democracy where such individuals directly participate in
governmental affairs by directly voting on issues and electing representative
officials.94 On December 19, 1791, only four days after the Bill of Rights was
ratified,95 James Madison stated in the National Gazette96 that, “[p]ublic opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free
one.”97 Madison’s ultimate view was that a free country ultimately depends
on open public opinion.98 He believed that those who tried to suppress opinions through restrictions on speech were opponents of democracy.99
The notion that a democratic society should guard free speech in order to
allow differing opinions for the purpose of protecting liberty stems back to
the Enlightenment period.100 Since antiquity, laws have existed that prohibited expressing or even believing in differing views or opinions.101 For example, many conflicting social and political opinions were outlawed because either the church or the state viewed them as dangerous or false.102
By 1275, legislation prohibiting the freedom of speech existed in England.103 Laws against seditious libel were also enacted, which prohibited criticism of the government.104 Further, there existed laws against blasphemous

94. See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003,
1022–28 (2013).
95. Today in History – December 15: The Bill of Rights, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/december-15/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
96. The National Gazette, based in Philadelphia, was one of the most influential newspapers in the
early years of the United States. About National Gazette, LIBR. OF CONG., https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83025887/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
97. For the National Gazette, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0145 (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
98. Jay Cost, James Madison’s Lesson on Free Speech, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/james-madison-free-speech-rights-must-be-absolutenearly/.
99. Id.
100. See Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1273–
74 (2004).
101. Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Taking Liberties with John Stuart Mill, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 397–
98 (1999).
102. Id.
103. John Simkin, The History of Freedom Speech in the UK, SPARTACUS EDUC. (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://spartacus-educational.com/spartacus-blogURL116.htm.
104. Id.
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libel, prohibiting criticism of religion.105 Less than a century later, the 1351
Treason Act was codified, making it a crime to “compass or imagine” the
death of the king.106 All these laws aimed to suppress opinions that differed
from the political or religious entity in power.
Political philosophers who sparked the Enlightenment, including John
Locke, opposed the suppression and intolerance of differing opinions.107
Locke and the Enlightenment teachings influenced the Founding Fathers to
establish the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.108 In addition to the Founding Fathers, John Stuart Mill was also heavily influenced by
the teachings of Enlightenment-era philosophers. Mill was inspired by John
Milton’s theory of the “marketplace of ideas” published in Areopagitica in
1644.109 In his book On Liberty, Mill expanded on Milton’s idea, explaining
that every individual has the ability to critically evaluate opinions, and having
disfavored opinions helps in the search of the truth because they encourage
the introduction of newer perspectives to into society.110
Mill’s own theoretical philosophies would ultimately influence Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.111 Justice Holmes’ famous dissent
in Abrams v. United States introduced the marketplace of ideas theory into the
Court’s analytic framework, emphasizing the Constitution’s protections of the
free trade of ideas.112 Holmes stated, “the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”113
The marketplace of ideas has become an influential theory of the rationale
behind the First Amendment. It is clear that the Enlightenment teachings advocating the dissemination of differing opinions influenced the Constitution,
namely the Bill of Rights, and the Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing free
speech issues.

105. Id.
106. Aisha Gani, Treason Act: the facts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/17/treason-act-facts-british-extremists-iraq-syria-isis.
107. Ofseyer, supra note 101, at 398.
108. Robb A. McDaniel, John Locke, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1257/john-locke (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
109. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1160,
1168 (2015).
110. Id.
111. Ofseyer, supra note 101, at 395.
112. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. Granting Some Protection to Data Privacy is Necessary for the
Democratic Process
Given the history behind the rationale of free speech—beginning with the
philosophers of the Enlightenment, then followed by Founding Fathers and
early Supreme Court jurisprudence—it is clear that the First Amendment at
its core is supposed to protect differing opinions. By protecting differing
opinions and introducing all ideas into the open market, individuals are able
to more critically engage in society. Ideas are introduced and fleshed out
through rational discussion. Further, having an intelligent and participatory
citizenry is necessary for the self-governance that the Founding Fathers envisioned. For a government “by the people for the people” to operate effectively, its populace must be able to engage freely in discussion and express
unpopular opinions, prompting the free exchange in ideas, so that eventually
the truth or the best idea prevails.
The same rationale that justifies free speech—to allow the citizenry to
cultivate thoughts and disseminate differing opinions for the search of good
ideas to strengthen their democracy—also justifies a level of privacy that must
be afforded to all people. Big Data poses a heightened threat to privacy because almost every action a person engages in is documented through the creation of data trails.114
Professor Bambauer, who argues that data is speech, addresses the concerns regarding the inherent tension that on the one hand, data allows individuals to access information and become better informed, but on the other hand,
if everything is on display, people may not engage in certain activities.115
Self-censorship may take place, which can have the same detrimental effect
as prohibiting speech. Individuals may not engage in certain activities that
they otherwise would have if their data was not being tracked and used. As a
result of not engaging in certain ventures, individuals, consequently, will not
critically wrestle with the knowledge they would have gained. Thus, individuals will not have the opportunity to contribute their would-be new and enlightened ideas to the marketplace.
To put this idea into more concrete terms, let’s say an individual, Abby,
114. See Tim Henderson, States battle big tech over data privacy laws, GCN (July 31, 2019),
https://gcn.com/articles/2019/07/31/state-privacy-laws.aspx.
115. Bambauer, supra note 42, at 101.
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wants to learn more about terrorism and wants to conduct online research as
to how the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) uses propaganda to recruit
members.116 However, Abby is afraid of how her search data will be used by
third parties and is worried she may get flagged by The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security for suspicious activity.117 She does not want to deal with
the consequences of investigators searching through all her personal data or a
potential police visit to her home.
Consequently, Abby does not want to go to direct sites where ISIS propaganda is disseminated. She instead restricts her inquiry of ISIS’s propaganda
to secondary sources that she considers safe and not directly connected to
ISIS, such as the New York Times and Washington Post websites.
If Abby had visited the sites that ISIS uses directly to disseminate its messages, she would have been able to gain insightful information firsthand on
how ISIS tries to connect with those who may be vulnerable, willing recipients
to ISIS propaganda.118 She was not able to receive this illuminating information through the secondary sites because it was dulled down and somewhat
censored. If Abby had directly seen ISIS’s propaganda, it may have enabled
her to grapple with what she saw and read. She then could have possibly come
up with counter-content to gain the attention of those visiting propaganda sites
and perhaps saved lives. In this hypothetical, Abby would not have been able
to come up with her meaningful counter-message if she had not seen the content first-hand.
Abby’s fear of being flagged as a threat by searching suspicious content
is not irrational. The U.S. government has, in recent years, engaged in “flagging” individuals as security threats for simply inquiring into certain information online.119 In 2013, the Guardian released a story about how the Unites
States National Security Agency (“NSA”) used a system called XKeyscore,
to search for suspicious activity through vast databases containing emails,
116. See Henderson, supra note 114.
117. See Ryan Browne, ISIS may be quashed on the ground, but it’s still a ‘problem’ online, EU
security official says, CNBC (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/06/isis-isstill-a-problem-online-eu-security-official-julian-king.html.
118. See Evan Perez, How ISIS is luring so many Americans to join its ranks, CNN (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/22/politics/isis-recruits-american-arrests/index.html (explaining that,
whereas al Qaeda relied on radicalizing those who wished to “join the fight to protect Islamic holy
lands[,]” the approach of ISIS is “more secular . . . ‘portraying how much better life purportedly is in
the caliphate as compared to the corrupt West.”’).
119. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Feds Monitoring Social Media Does More Harm Than Good,
WIRED (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-social-media-immigrants-greencard/.
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online chats, and browsing history of millions of people.120 In Abby’s case,
the NSA could have flagged specific keywords through XKeyscore to uncover
Abby’s ISIS-related search activity, then subsequently gained access to and
searched all of her personal digital information—despite the fact that she was
not a real terrorist threat.
Additionally, police may have also paid a visit to Abby’s home because
of her internet search history. Another Guardian article stated that a woman
and her family were visited by counterterrorism police because they were
flagged for suspicious activity relating to their internet searches.121 The
woman had searched online about a pressure cooker.122 Her husband had
searched about getting a backpack.123 Together with their son’s online reading
habits, which entailed clicking on links about popular terrorism news stories,
the family was flagged for suspicious terrorist activity.124 Consequently, the
woman stated that if she ever bought a pressure cooker, she would not do so
online.125 This illustrates that having one’s private information searched or
being paid a visit by investigators to one’s home can prevent a person from
engaging in enhancing one’s knowledge, a valuable tool in a democracy.
In addition to self-censorship, another risk posed by the lack of data privacy is that data analytics will actually reduce exposure to competing ideas.126
This decline can occur through data analytics assessing an individual’s data
pertaining to politics and news sources, then using the data to suggest other
news sources that that individual will like based on their political viewpoint.
This decreases an individual’s exposure to news sources with differing perspectives and creates an “echo chamber” exposing individuals only to viewpoints that align with their own.127
Professor Julie Cohen has voiced her concerns about echo chambers, affirming that they do not foster political dialogue among diverse
120. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA tool collects ‘nearly everything a user does on the internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secretprogram-online-data.
121. Michele Cantalano, My family’s Google searching got us a visit from counterterrorism police,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/01/government-tracking-google-searches.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Bambauer, supra note 42, at 102 n.208.
127. William Saletan, How to escape a partisan echo chamber, SLATE (May 3, 2010),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/05/how-to-escape-a-partisan-echo-chamber.html.
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perspectives.128 She explains that the purpose of Big Data is to “produce tractable, predictable citizen-consumers whose preferred modes of self-determination play out along predictable and profit-generating trajectories.”129 Big
Data analysts can then subtly nudge citizen-consumers via advertisements into
directions that correspond with profit-maximizing goals.130
Professor Cohen argues that decisions made by today’s citizens, with Big
Data predicting their paths for them, do not “resemble the independent decisions, formed through robust and open debate, that . . . liberal democracy requires to sustain and perfect itself.”131 This Big Data infiltration of privacy
has enabled commercial and government actors to render individuals as fixed,
transparent, and predictable.132 Without some privacy, individuals become
predictable and can be more easily guided in the direction commercial or government actors want, and the First Amendments policy objectives will be rendered useless. This diminishes critical thinking among individual citizens, the
emergence of differing ideas, and, ultimately, threatens the form of self-governance envisioned by the Founding Fathers.
IV. A SOLUTION FOR PROTECTING DATA
A. Lack of Transparency in First Amendment Law
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech is a murky133 area of law
that seems to receive inconsistent treatment by Supreme Court Justices. Both
the Court and legal scholars have acknowledged that not all speech is protected.134 Justice Holmes notably declared in Schenck v. U.S. that “[t]he most

128. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1917 (2013).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1917–18.
132. Id. at 1905.
133. The word “murky” is used to refer to inconsistencies in which the Court has created case law
but has seemingly reversed such law without explicitly saying so. For example, in Chaplinsky, which
regarded the unprotected category of fighting words, the Court carved out an exception to First
Amendment protection for words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.” Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Court has since never
upheld a conviction against a speaker for fighting words. See Burton Caine, The Trouble with
“Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should
Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 536 (2004); The Demise of Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 HARV. L REV. 1129, 1129 (1993).
134. Schauer, supra note 877, at 1284.
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stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”135 In his opinion in Frohwerk, written
only a few days after the Schenck decision, Holmes expanded on Schenck by
stating that the First Amendment was not “intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language.”136 Despite the consensus that the First
Amendment does not afford protection to all speech, there is still much confusion about its scope. The question of its scope becomes particularly difficult
when freedom of speech is at odds with other generally accepted societal values.137
Historically, in determining the scope of First Amendment protection for
freedom of speech, the Court balanced the value of speech against the social
harm it caused.138 The Court carved out categories of low-value unprotected
speech by performing a balancing test that was based on intuition rather than
any data or hard facts.139 In part, through balancing, the Court created the free
speech exceptions of fraud, obscenity, and true threats.140 Further, in establishing the low-value category of fighting words, the Court applied a balancing test, reasoning such words “are of such slight social value . . . that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”141
However, because of the administrative unpredictability that comes with
an ad hoc balancing approach, recently the Court has shifted to a more rulesbased approach in its low-value speech analysis.142 In United States v. Stevens, the Court rejected the government’s argument to use a balancing approach in order to uphold a law criminalizing the creation, sale, or possession
of certain depictions of animal cruelty.143 Although the Court acknowledged
that the government’s argument did not arise out of a vacuum—because the
Court had used balancing approaches in the past—it nevertheless rejected the

135. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding speech circulated on leaflets during wartime
calling for opposition to the draft as unprotected for posing a clear and present danger).
136. Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (holding that a speech disseminated during World
War I criticizing the U.S.’s involvement in the war was unprotected).
137. Schauer, supra note 87, at 1285.
138. Davis S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 365 (2015).
139. Id. at 366.
140. Id.
141. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
142. Han, supra note 138, at 367.
143. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010).
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government’s approach.144 The Court instead implemented the historical test
in carving out unprotected categories of speech, basing its analysis on whether
the categories of speech at issue have been “historically unprotected.”145 The
Court reiterated that this was always the approach to recognizing a category
of low-value speech, despite using a balancing analysis with other categories.146
Because the Court has been unclear on how to determine the scope of the
First Amendment’s protection, crafting a solution that will afford data information privacy is difficult. It is not evident whether the Court will at any point
revert back to a more equitable balancing approach, weighing the value of the
speech against the harm posed. Further, with regard to future application of
the current historical test, it is unclear how far the Court will go in using historical analogies to render decisions. For example, will the Court allow for
more creative, modern arguments that were likely not considered by the
Founding Fathers upon the enactment of the First Amendment? Or, does the
specific harm have to have existed during the founding of the United States?
Because of the lack of clarity concerning how to render certain speech unprotected under the First Amendment, this Article takes the position that the most
feasible approach for enacting data privacy regulations is to use the Commercial Speech Doctrine.
B. History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Commercial Speech Doctrine, though firmly established, comes with
its own set of issues that could lead to confusion. Like with the First Amendment, the Court has been unclear about the scope of the doctrine. When the
doctrine was first introduced, the Court said that commercial speech was fully
unprotected speech. However, the Court later stated that commercial speech
is somewhat protected and is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Despite this
lack of consistency within the Commercial Speech Doctrine, it still seems to
be the best solution for data information privacy.
The Commercial Speech Doctrine originated in 1942, when the Court, in
Valentine v. Chrestensen, held that commercial speech was an unprotected
category of speech.147 In this case, F.J. Chrestensen owned a former United
144.
145.
146.
147.
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States Navy submarine which he brought to a New York City pier.148
Chrestensen allowed the public to tour the vessel in exchange for an admission
fee.149 Chrestensen passed out a double-sided handbill on the streets, with one
side advertising the vessel, but the other side protesting against the department
in charge of the dock.150 He created the double-sided handbill because he was
trying to advertise his tours without violating a New York sanitary code,
which prohibited distribution of commercial material in the street.151 After
Chrestensen was charged in violation of the code, he argued the code violated
his First Amendment right to free speech.152
The Court upheld New York City’s code, reasoning that the Constitution
does not constrain the government from regulating purely commercial advertising.153 The Court further explained that it would be up to legislative judgment to determine whether and to what extent someone “may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets.”154 The Court’s opinion did not parse
out the content of Chrestensen’s handbill to see how much of it was commercial speech, because Chrestensen intentionally added the other information
only to try to convert his speech into non-commercial speech.155
However, in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Virginia State Board), the Court departed from
its ruling that commercial speech is completely unprotected and instead found
it be partially protected.156 In Virginia State Board, consumers of prescription
drugs brought an action to strike down a law prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising the price of prescription drugs.157 The Court held that the regulation was unconstitutional and in violation of the First Amendment.158 The
Court reasoned that commercial speech is not so far removed from the exposition of ideas so as to render it unprotected.159 The Court then explained how

U.S. 808 (1991).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id. at 54–55.
154. Id. at 54.
155. Id. at 55.
156. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 748 (1976).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 773.
159. Id. at 762.
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price information on prescription drugs may be information more useful to the
receiver than “the day’s most urgent political debate.”160 Prescription drugs
are often very expensive and inability to compare prices harms the poor, sick,
and aged.161 Finally, the Court stressed that purely commercial speech may
still be of public interest.162
In 1980, the Court expanded on the Commercial Speech Doctrine and set
out the doctrine’s current test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York (“Central Hudson”).163 There, Central
Hudson challenged a law that prohibited advertising that promoted the use of
electricity.164 The Court adopted and applied a four-step test and found that
the law was unconstitutional.165 The Court laid out the test as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.166
The Court applied this analysis to the regulation in question. First, the
Court determined the commercial speech fell under the protection of the First
Amendment because it did not relate to unlawful activity, and it was not misleading.167 As to the second factor, the Court determined that the government
has a substantial interest in conserving energy.168 For the third factor, the
Court concluded that the state’s interest was directly advanced by the regulation because advertising is directly connected to demand.169 The Court reasoned that Central Hudson would not be fighting this ban if it did not believe

160.
161.
162.
163.
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165.
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that advertising would increase sales.170 However, the Court found that the
regulation failed factor four.171 Finally, in applying the fourth factor, the
Court found that the government failed to prove that a more limited regulation
could not serve the same interests it had in conserving power.172
Most recently, as mentioned in Part II, the Court’s controversial decision
in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. struck down a law which prohibited the sale,
disclosure, or use of information about doctors’ prescribing habits for marketing purposes.173 The majority opinion analyzed the constitutionality of the
law under heightened scrutiny because the regulation was content-based.174
However, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s decision to apply a higher
standard.175 Justice Breyer argued that the First Amendment does not require
extra heightened scrutiny when the government’s regulation burdens speech
in an effort to regulate the commercial industry.176 Breyer called the heightened scrutiny applied by the majority in commercial speech cases “unprecedented.”177 The dissent argued that the regulation should have been analyzed
under intermediate scrutiny and upheld for meeting the standard.178
C. Regulating Data Privacy Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Despite the lack of transparency regarding First Amendment free speech
jurisprudence, and even the commercial speech doctrine, the most feasible
way to tackle the data privacy issue is with the Supreme Court’s most recent
four-step test.
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech that proposes a transaction.179 The sale and use of consumer data for marketing purposes falls into the category of commercial speech. The Court has defined
commercial speech as speech that proposes a transaction.180 The data-mining

170. Id.
171. Id. 569–570.
172. Id. at 570.
173. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
174. Id. 563–64, 566 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
175. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 581 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. (“Central Hudson”), 447 U.S.
557, 562 (1980).
180. See, e.g., id. at 562.
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industry primarily exists to sell consumer data to third parties or directly use
the data it has collected for marketing purposes, ultimately, in order to enter
into a transaction for the sale of consumer goods or services. In both scenarios, profits are being made based off of the data information collected from
consumers.
Regulating data information collection through the Commercial Speech
Doctrine may not directly address the hypothetical posed earlier where Abby
self-censored herself by not visiting terrorist-affiliated websites out of fear she
would be flagged. However, by addressing data information privacy in the
commercial context, the widespread trails of information produced by private
actors would be reduced.
Consequently, less information would be available for the government to
tap into. Regulating private search engine’s use and sale of consumer data
information collection would not only diminish other private companies from
using such information for commercial purposes, but it would also prevent the
government from gaining access to use it for its own purposes.
Further, if the government wants to create its own data trails directly and
use that information, the legislature can directly regulate this because such
laws would be regulating the government itself. There are no First Amendment issues at play when the government regulates its own speech. Therefore,
data privacy protection through applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine
would prevent the government and commercial industries from having unlimited and unrestricted access to the that data citizen-consumers produce online.
Moving forward, the Supreme Court should analyze the constitutionality
of data information regulations relating to marketing by applying the Central
Hudson test. First, the Court should determine whether the commercial
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.181 Assuming the speech
is lawful and not misleading, it will fall within First Amendment commercial
speech protection.182
For the second factor, the Court should recognize general privacy concerns for citizens as a substantial governmental interest.183 As explained in
parts 1-III, if there are no safeguards to online privacy and everyone is constantly exposed, democracy itself is threatened.
Regarding the third factor, the Court must address whether the law at

181. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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issue directly advances the government’s substantial interest.184 If the law is
prohibiting the dissemination or use of certain data information, it will directly
advance the government’s substantial interest in securing the privacy of U.S.
citizens. Limiting the disclosure and use of data prevents would-be Big Data
users from obtaining personal information about individuals that Big Data users would consequently use to make predictions about such individuals.
If U.S. citizens are going to be afforded any data information privacy, the
last factor is where legislatures and the Court should take extra care. The
fourth factor requires that the regulation at issue be no more extensive than is
necessary to serve the government’s interest.185 To clarify this point, the Court
has not interpreted this to require the least restrictive regulation as possible,
but rather requires a rational balance between the government’s end and the
means chosen to achieve it.186 This can be “a fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served . . . .’”187 Thus, the
Court can uphold a data information regulation even if it is not the least restrictive means possible for securing the government’s interest in preserving
citizens’ information privacy.
In the future, legislatures and the Court should delineate what is “not more
extensive than is necessary” to mean data privacy laws that directly pertain to
securing the four protections common in codes of fair information practices.
Regulation of data information should constitute a reasonable fit where the
scope of the protection proportionate to the interest it is meant to serve. These
laws will likely pass constitutional muster if such regulations pertain to protecting: (1) the use of data consistent with the reason for collecting the data;188
(2) individuals’ right to notice and the ability to participate in how their information is being used;189 (3) sensitive data pertaining to race, sexual orientation, political views, and religion by providing more protections;190 and (4)
available remedies for individuals who have been violated pursuant to the
three principles just listed.191
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By following these principles, laws should constitute a reasonable fit—
and pass the commercial speech test employed by the Supreme Court—because their scope is proportional to the substantial public interest served in
protection the privacy of U.S. citizens online.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the increased role that technology plays in individuals’ lives today,
it is necessary for the Supreme Court to afford some level of protection towards the disclosure and use of personal data information. Today, individuals
are constantly interacting with technology and are largely not afforded the
option to “opt out” of these modes of engagement in professional, social, and
political settings.
The ubiquity of technology creates an increasing threat to privacy and
diminishes the welfare of the populace. Specifically, the objectives behind a
robust First Amendment—the constant introduction and proliferation of competing ideas and a participatory citizenry that critically engages in self-governance—are threatened if privacy protections are not implemented for individuals online. People will be less informed and rendered predictable,
consequently becoming pigeonholed into their foreseeable place in society.192
Thus, it is necessary for courts in the U.S. to recognize the significant government interest in preserving privacy for the U.S. citizenry and upholding laws
that reasonably advance this interest.
The most feasible way to achieve data information privacy is through the
Commercial Speech Doctrine. Laws regulating data likely regulate speech,
and the First Amendment has been interpreted not only to protect speech, but
also the ideas that form before speech and, consequently, make speech possible. Therefore, data is likely speech and laws regulating data also regulate
speech.193
A huge commercial industry exists around data mining and using Big
Data to increase profits. Clearly, the commercial industry is involved because
behind all the information gathered from consumer data, commercial transactions are being proposed. These transactions are either to sell the data itself
or use the data directly in order to sell goods or services.
Ultimately, the government has a significant interest in preserving a level

192. Cohen, supra note 128.
193. See supra Part II.C.
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of privacy amongst citizens so that the United States can continue to function
through democratic self-governance. The time is ripe for the Court to view
future laws enacted to secure the protections embodied in codes of fair information practices as a reasonable fit to achieving the government’s ends in
preserving privacy.
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